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A Member of No Community? Theology after Wittgenstein
Brad J. Kallenberg

Wittgenstein studies has spawned a new sort of Christian theology. A growing list of
theologians have discovered in Wittgenstein a therapy for conceptual confusion and tips
for how to go on, not only in religious faith and practice, but also in the practice of
theology as an academic discipline.1 This is not to say that such thinkers have succeeded
in turning Wittgenstein into an instrument of apologetics or that Wittgenstein has
“delivered” them from the grip of their own religious particularity. No; they have learned
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See Fergus Kerr, “The Reception of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy by Theologians,” in Religion and
Wittgenstein’s Legacy, ed. D. Z. Phillips and Mario von der Ruhr (Aldershot, UK & Burlington, VT: Ashgate,
2005), 253-72. The more recent notables include Kerr’s own Theology after Wittgenstein (Oxford, UK: Basil
Blackwell, 1986). Garth L. Hallett, Identity and Mystery in Themes of Christian Faith; Late-Wittgensteinian
Perspectives (Hampshire, UK & Burlington, VA: Ashgate, 2005). Also of note are various essayists in Jeffrey
Stout and Robert MacSwain, eds., Grammar and Grace: Reformulations of Aquinas and Wittgenstein
(London: SCM Press, 2004). To these must be added the classic works by Herbert McCabe, Paul Holmer,
David Burrell and Staley Hauerwas. See Herbert McCabe, Law, Love and Language (New York: Continuum,
2004). See also, Paul Holmer, “Wittgenstein and Theology,” in New Essays on Religious Language, ed.
Dallas M. High (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1969), 25-35.; The Grammar of Faith (San Francisco,
CA: Harper and Row Publishers, 1978). And see David Burrell, Analogy and Philosophical Language (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1973). Perhaps most prolific of all Christian theologians who write under
the influence of Wittgenstein is Stanley Hauerwas. For my analysis of Hauerwas’s use of Wittgenstein, see
Brad J. Kallenberg, Ethics as Grammar: Changing the Postmodern Subject (Notre Dame, IN: University of
Notre Dame Press, 2001).

from Wittgenstein the skill of silence. Their theology, like Wittgenstein’s philosophy,
comes to a full stop.
What this full stop amounts to, of course, is a matter of discussion. D. Z. Phillips has
described “contemplative philosophy” as culminating in a “radical pluralism.”2 In this
essay, I will argue that the radical pluralism that is said to follow from contemplative
philosophy is so radical that the presumed “boundary” between philosophy and theology
is once more conceived as semi-permeable, a feature that lets back to the table at least a
few theologians.

CONTEMPLATIVE PHILOSOPHY
DZ Phillips describes “contemplative philosophy” as operating in the middle of a
spectrum between two extremes.3 On the side of the “too hot,” Phillips includes all
attempts by passionate thinkers to employ philosophy as an aid for figuring out such
puzzles as “the real nature of truth” or as a guide for advising people “how to live well.” In
the end, passionate ideologues end up constructing totalizing systems. In contrast to this
sort of “positive” philosophy, contemplative philosophy seeks to “do conceptual justice by
the world in all its variety.”4
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See D. Z. Phillips, Religion and the Hermeneutics of Contemplation (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 2001). See also his essay reprinted as “On Wittgenstein,” Philosophical Investigations 24,
no. 2 (2001): 147-53.
3
“Locating Philosophy’s Cool Place: A Reply to Stephen Mulhall,” in D.Z. Phillips’ Contemplative
Philosophy of Religion, ed. Andy F. Sanders (Aldershot, UK & Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007), 29-54.
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Opening paragraph of “Radical Pluralism,” in Festschrift..... ed. Brian Birch (Tübingen: Mohr
Siebeck, forthcoming). page #??
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On the side of “too cold” are those who insist that philosophy’s sole task is a
negative one, the clearing up of conceptual confusions in others’ work. Such a task will
inevitably keep the philosopher busy, since there is such an abundance of grammatical
confusion and misuse of language that needs sorting out.5 But Phillips resists the
suggestion that this is all philosophy can be about. In contrast to “negative” philosophy,
contemplative philosophy has more to do than clear away the underbrush. For in addition
to conceptual clarification, contemplative philosophy is also constituted by its central
concern regarding the riddle of the very possibility of discourse.
Contemplative philosophy, then, occupies the middle ground. The character of this
middle ground has been variously described in terms of “disinterest,” “neutrality” and
“coolness.”6 At stake for my argument is whether theologians are necessarily excluded
from the practice of contemplative philosophy, or from the radical pluralism this coolness
is said to entail.
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For examples of Phillips’s own “interventionist” style of philosophy see the essays in Interventions in
Ethics (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1992). See also Wittgenstein and Religion (London,
UK: St. Martin’s Press, 1993).
6
See Stephen Mulhall, “Wittgenstein’s Temple: Three Styles of Philosophical Architecture,” in D.Z.
Phillips’ Contemplative Philosophy of Religion, ed. Andy F. Sanders (Aldershot, UK & Burlington, VT:
Ashgate, 2007), 13-27; D. Z. Phillips, Philosophy’s Cool Place (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999);
Mario von der Ruhr, “Philosophy, Theology and Heresy: D. Z. Phillips and the Grammar of Religious Belief,”
in D.Z. Phillips’ Contemplative Philosophy of Religion, ed. Andy F. Sanders (Aldershot, UK & Burlington, VT:
Ashgate, 2007), 111-24..
I must raise a minor worry I have over von der Rurh’s image of contemplative philosophy as
“disinterested,” as “disinterest” is all too easily mistaken for the vantage point assumed by a Cartesian
spectator. While von de Ruhr is surely right to see contemplative philosophy at a distance from “partisan
apologetics,” he uncarefully asserts that contemplative philosophy’s “proper task is attentive and
disinterested description” (59). If one is entirely disinterested, why would one bother to begin? Elsewhere
Phillips has shown that criteria for description are context dependent—think of someone who, while
observing an act of mugging, gives the play-by-play in monotone medical-ese rather than reflexively
shouting for help. Such dispassionate action would be neither praiseworthy nor contemplative. It would be
subhuman. See the delightful essays in D. Z. Phillips, Introducing Philosophy: The Challenge of Scepticism
(Oxford, UK & Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1996).
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To be sure, historians of philosophy have habitually described philosophy as
bifurcated from theology. And many Wittgensteinians have followed suit. This can be felt
in the strong temptation to read Zettel §455 proscriptively.
(Der Philosoph ist nicht Bürger einer Denkgemeinde. Das ist, was ihn zum
Philosophen macht.)
(The philosopher is not a citizen of any community of ideas. That is what
makes him into a philosopher.)
Stephen Mulhall paraphrases the German this way: “that a philosopher should not be a
citizen of a community of ideas.”7 In favor of a proscriptive reading is Wittgenstein’s own
characterization of logician Frank Ramsey as a “bourgeois” (bürgerlich) thinker.
Wittgenstein went on to complain that
he [Ramsey] thought with the aim of clearing up the affairs of some particular
community [Gemeinde; municipality]. He did not reflect on the essence of the
state (Staat)…but on how this state might be reasonably organized. The idea
that this state might not be the only possible one in part disquieted him and in
part bored him. He wanted to get down as quickly as possible to reflecting on
the foundation—of this state. This was what he was good at…whereas real
philosophical reflection disturbed him….8
Wittgenstein apparently thought Ramsey was mistaken to be so grounded in the affairs of
“some particular community.” Yet there is another way to read §455. If “bourgeois”
translates bürgerlich, surely Wittgenstein used the cognate Bürger (“citizen”) in §455 for
the way it conjures images of clubby, upper-class merchants.9 The upshot? Wittgenstein
knew that his sort of philosophy made him a de facto outsider to the Cambridge
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Mulhall, “Wittgenstein’s Temple: Three Styles of Philosophical Architecture,” 21. Emphasis added.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, ed. G. H. von Wright and Heikki Nyman, trans. Peter
Winch, English translation with the amended 2nd. ed. (Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1980), 17e.
9
Thanks to Terry Tilley for this insight.
8
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“Philosophers’ Club.” Taken in this way, Z§455 may simply be a self-description, a
repetition of the maxim: a prophet is never welcomed by the hometown crowd.10
There is evidence that Wittgenstein perceived himself in countercultural terms; he
perceived himself as living in a kind of self-imposed “exile” from culture at large.11 Recall
that Wittgenstein once remarked to Drury, “My type of thinking is not wanted in this
present age, I have to swim so strongly against the tide. Perhaps in a hundred years
people will really want what I am writing.”12 In the meantime, Wittgenstein himself wrote
for a particular community:
If I say that my book is meant for only a small circle of people (if it can be
called a circle), I do not mean that I believe this circle to be the élite of
mankind; but it does comprise those to whom I turn (not because they are
better or worse than others but) beck they form my cultural milieu, my fellow
citizens as it were [gleichsam die Menschen meines Vaterlandes], in contrast to
the rest who are foreign [fremd] to me.13
The question remains, did Wittgenstein intend the parenthetical remark (Z§455) as
anything more than self-description? Must the Zettel text be read proscriptively?
In what follows, I will argue that Wittgenstein’s remark in Zettel need not be taken
as proscriptive advice to would-be contemplative philosophers for two reasons. First,
contemplative philosophy is itself a human craft and as such is constituted by overlapping
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“Prophets are not without honor, except in their hometown, and among their own kin, and in their
own house.” Mark 6:4, NRSV.
11
James C. Klagge, “Wittgenstein in Exile,” in Religion and Wittgenstein’s Legacy, ed. D.Z. Phillips and
Mario von der Ruhr (Aldershot, UK & Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005).
12
M. O’C. Drury, “Conversations with Wittgenstein,” in Recollections of Wittgenstein, ed. Rush Rhees
(Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1984), 91-189. Citation from 73. Klagge observes that in Wittgenstein’s
mind the previous hundred years, at least since Schumann’s death in 1856, marked the beginning of the end
of Western culture as per Oswald Spengler’s vision. Oswald Spengler, Der Untergang Des Abendlandes:
Umrisse Einer Morphologie Der Weltgeschichte (Munich: Beck, 1922-23). These volumes were translated into
English by Charles Francis Atkinson and published by Alfred Knopf in 1926-28.
13
Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 10e.
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modes of discourse with the result that the dividing line between one craft and another
passes through the hearts of human speakers. Consequently, the intention to surrender
membership in communities of discourse in the name of contemplative philosophy may
prove to be as wrongheaded as the quest for “objectivity” proved to be in former times.
Second, the grammar of “theology” does not admit the sort of definitional precision
needed for either Zettel §455 or Phillips’s statement to function as a universal prohibition.
I will take up each of these in turn.

CONTEMPLATIVE PHILOSOPHY AS A CRAFT
The word “craft” may raise images of Aristotelian poēsis and the related notions of
technē and “technique.” For Aristotle, making shoes was a craft. But I do not use the term
in this sense. By the term “craft” I mean those complex, cooperative enterprises—such as
medicine, engineering, mathematics, music—for which standards of excellence (against
which novices are measured for progress) are internal to the activities of the craft itself
and are embodied by the behavior (both in the sense of tacit skills of judgment and
discourse) of the expert practitioners.14 Just as the standards of excellence may be read off
the play of the craft yet never be codified successfully (much less completely), so too
crafts can never be reduced to domains of information. The skilled musician knows when
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It should be evident that I have been deeply formed by theological reflection on the family
resemblance between Alasdair MacIntyre’s seminal vocabulary and ancient Christian notions such as
“discipleship.” See James Wm. McClendon, Jr., Ethics: Systematic Theology, Volume I (Nashville, TN:
Abingdon Press, 1986), esp. ch. 6. His torturous definition of “practice” can be found in Alasdair MacIntyre,
After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 2d ed. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 187.
6

the bass is “too heavy,” though will be unable to describe this in advance (much less to
non-musicians).15
Philosophy, especially as Wittgenstein practiced it, shares important characteristics
with other crafts. Chief among these features for my argument is the developmental
nature of the craft. Practitioners who try hard in the right way tend to improve in their
craft-relevant skills, albeit slowly over a long time. Wittgenstein viewed his craft as
necessarily involving “work on oneself,”16 and even near life’s end he worked hard to
shape and reshape his thinking in various ways. Wittgenstein’s students saw this and
tried to keep up. It almost goes without saying that Wittgenstein’s students, even the
ones who understood him poorly, instinctively responded to him as good novices respond
to any master in whose presence there is the best hope of one’s own progress. The means
of progress in this case was direct contact with Wittgenstein as mentor. In addition to
group discussion, a privileged few carried on private conversations with Wittgenstein.
And when they were not in group or private tutorials, they painstakingly wrote down
verbatim everything they could possibly remember, put it in order, and published
memoirs that reproduced Wittgenstein’s words. Think of conversations transcribed by
Friedrich Waismann and Maurice O’C. Drury, of Norman Malcolm’s memoirs, Rush
Rhees’s recollections, the compiling, editing and translating of Georg von Wright and
Elizabeth Anscombe, the class notes of Alice Ambrose, Cyril Barrett, G.E. Moore, and
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This illustration is Wittgenstein’s own. G.E. Moore, “Wittgenstein’s Lectures in 1930–33,” in
Philosophical Occasions, 1912–1952, ed. James C. Klagge and Alfred Nordmann (Indianapolis & Cambridge:
Hackett Publishing, 1993), 46-117. Citation from 05.
16
Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 24e.
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others. If we are honest, we have to admit that for all of these “disciples,” the words of
Wittgenstein function as canonical in general and, in particular, tips for their personal
growth in the craft.17
Of course, a savvy reader is understandably leery of student notes. After all, their
quality is so very uneven. Fergus Kerr observed that student notes for the Cambridge
Lectures of 1946-47 taken by P. T. Geach, K. J. Shah and A. C. Jackson are so dissimilar
from one another that it almost appears as if these students were attending different
seminars!18 Wittgenstein was aware of this unevenness and lamented to Drury, “If you
write these spontaneous remarks down, someday someone may publish them as my
considered opinions. I don’t want that done. For I am talking now freely as my ideas
come, but all this will need a lot more thought and better expression.” (Drury goes on to
comment parenthetically, “This indeed is what was done later in the volume called
Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief.”19) Such
unevenness of understanding is to be expected among apprentices. Yet one thing is
certain: these students adopted the posture of apprenticeship precisely because they
recognized that studying with Wittgenstein was a craft.
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“Can we learn this knowledge? Yes; some can. Not, however, by taking a course in it, but through
“experience.”—Can someone else be a man’s teacher in this? Certainly. From time to time he gives him the
right tip.—This is what “learning” and “teaching” are like here.—What one acquires here is not a technique;
one learns correct judgments. There are also rules, but they do not form a system, and only experienced
people can apply them right. Unlike calculation rules.” Philosophical Investigations, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe
and Rush Rhees, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan, 1953), part II.227e.
18
Fergus Kerr, “Work on Oneself”: Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Psychology, Institute for the
Psychological Sciences Monograph Series (Arlington, VA: Psychological Sciences Press, 2008), 8.
19
Drury, “Conversations with Wittgenstein,” 155.
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I want to highlight in particular three marks of contemplative philosophy that
display its cooperative, progressive and self-involving character as a craft. First,
contemplative philosophers must learn the self-discipline of resisting the craving for
general explanation (since generalizing runs the risk of excluding the very differences
contemplative philosophy aims to elucidate).20 Correlative with the refusal to generalize
is, second, the insistence that description be done in terms commensurable with the
thing described. I don’t mean that Wittgenstein objected to using object-language to
describe cups on tables. I mean rather that since the phenomena under investigation
involves moves in language games (sentences, gestures, etc.), those who offer descriptions
of these linguistic moves must work hard to keep their language of description within the
range of the language they are describing lest an alien language be introduced, one that
would of course itself require indexing for aptness and so on, ad infinitum.21
In addition to the self-involving tasks of submission to a mentor and acquisition of
the habit of attentive description (while resisting the craving to explain), contemplative
philosophy is marked, third, by what Phillips called “moral” prerequisite for practicing

20

“Our disease is one of wanting to explain.” Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of
Mathematics, ed. G. H. von Wright, Rush Rhees, and G. E. M. Anscombe, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe
(Cambridge, MA and London, UK: MIT Press, 1978), VI §31. The term “craving for generality” was first used
by Wittgenstein in the Blue Book. The Blue & Brown Books (London: Harper Perennial, 1965), 17.
21
Of course, Wittgenstein was the master of conducting contemplative philosophy as an enterprise
on the same order as the language under investigation. Novice German readers are often surprised to find
Wittgenstein’s German so easy to read. Evidently Wittgenstein refused to propagate any sentence that
explains or describes phenomena by means of concepts outside the experience as reported by the human
subjects themselves. For example, despite all that music meant to Wittgenstein, he consistently resorted to
silence rather than employ extra-musical concepts to describe music. Wittgenstein’s reticence is often
frustrating since philosophers are proud of their technical vocabulary which they invent in hopes of
clarifying the sense of the sentence. But Wittgenstein thought this temptation must be resisted. In the place
of generalization, one must learn to attend to particulars. For “the limit of language is shown by its being
impossible to describe the fact which …is the translation of a… sentence, without simply repeating the
sentence.” Culture and Value, 10e.
9

with excellence. In order to do conceptual justice to religious life in all its varieties,
Phillips recommends contemplative philosophy be done in a “cool place,” one free from
ideological passion, a freedom in which “philosophical contemplation endeavors to let the
world be itself in all its variety. It allows the hubbub of voices and their diverse relations
to each other to be themselves.”22 Lest this recommendation be mistaken for a mere “live
and let live” policy on the one hand or a hankering after dispassionate, Cartesian
objectivity on the other, both of which stances Phillips holds to be confused, I propose
that the “moral requirement” of contemplative philosophy be understood as linked with
the faculty of skilled judgment that is progressively acquired.
Novices—of carpentry, of music, of philosophy, of whatever craft—slowly acquire
skilled judgment through training, and they are aided in this pursuit by the gradual
mastery of the relevant conceptual language. In fact, conceptual mastery is partially
constitutive of this skilled judgment. But as Rush Rhees has shown with his classic essay,
no single domain of discourse is hermetically sealed off from the rest of speaking; at least
not in real life. When the builders of PI §2 return home from an exhausting day of “Slab!”
and “Block!” it will be natural for them to use these same expressions when they talk with
family members about what they did all day. In order for the builders’ simple language
really to be imaginable as a complete language game, there must be much more to their
form of life, and how their speaking on the job is related to the rest of their living must be
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From the introductory essay of this volume by Phillips. Page 5 in the typescript.
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evident. In other words, the “complete” language game of building cannot be separated
from the rest of speaking and living without ceasing to be a complete language game.23
The overlapping character of language games itself contributes to the skill
development of the novice. Like children, novices learn fluency by clumsy participation in
conversations in which each conversant brings something to bear on the conversation.
Sometimes what is brought to bear is tremendously helpful: as human practices are
constituted by over-lapping domains of discourse, unbidden yet felicitous cross-practice
transfer of concepts and judgment sometimes happens. In other words, on occasion, a
practitioner is helped toward skilled judgment in one craft by means of fluency
painstakingly acquired in an alternate domain of discourse.24 This happy phenomena can
be illustrated by Wittgenstein’s own example: his contemplative philosophy was assisted
by his ability to view the world under the aspect of engineering.25
Apart from a handful of sources, few Wittgensteinians recognize much of value in
the lingering presence of Wittgenstein’s graduate work in engineering on his
philosophical investigations. Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin noted that Wittgenstein
deliberately followed physicist Heinrich Hertz’s use of “modeling” (Darstellung) rather
than Ernst Mach’s “representation” (Vorstellung) to express world and language as

23

Rush Rhees, “Wittgenstein’s Builders,” in Discussions of Wittgenstein (Bristol, UK: Thoemmes
Press, 1996), 71-84. See esp. 75-77.
24
On the phenomenon of “cross-domain transfer” of tips from one field into an entirely unrelated
field (e.g., from bicycling to aeronautics!), see Brad J. Kallenberg, “Cross Domain Transfer and Design,” in
By Design: Theology, Ethics and the Practice of Engineering (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2013), 208-47.
25
“Rethinking Fideism through the Lens of Wittgenstein’s Engineering Outlook,” International
Journal for the Philosophy of Religion 71, no. 1 (2012): 55-73.
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internally related.26 Raymond Monk, Brian McGuiness, and Bernhard Leitner each note
Wittgenstein’s prowess in all things mechanical, how he built a working sewing machine
at age 12, patented a propeller design at age 22, repaired machinery at a local factory when
he lived in Norway in his early thirties, meticulously designed and oversaw the
construction of a Bauhaus home for his sister at age 35, and at age 54 built a an apparatus
for a war-time hospital for recording blood pressure for patients suffering from pulsus
paradoxus (rapid decline in pulse).27 It is important whether this training conditioned in
some way Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. Kelly Hamilton sees Wittgenstein’s
engineering training as limited in scope to his Tractarian outlook.28 But Susan Sterrett
argues most convincingly that Wittgenstein’s engineering training may have had a lasting
influence also on his later philosophy.29

26

The latter term, employed by turn-of-the-century scientists like Ernst Mach, presumes language
and world to be externally related. However, the former term was borrowed from physicist Heinrich Hertz
who described the way in which (engineering) models of the world could be assessed by a criterion that
expressed an internal relation between modeler and world. On the criterion of Zweckmäßigkeit see Allan
Janik and Stephen Toulmin, Wittgenstein’s Vienna (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1973), 179-84.
27
Examples in chronological order: ibid.; Brian McGuinness, ed. Wittgenstein: A Life. Young Ludwig
1889-1921 (Volume 1) (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988); Ray Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein:
The Duty of Genius (New York: Viking Penguin, 1990). Bernhard Leitner, The Architecture of Ludwig
Wittgenstein : A Documentation, with Excerpts from the Family Recollections by Hermine Wittgenstein
(London & New York: Academy Editions and St. Martin’s Press, 1995). J. R. Henderson, “Ludwig
Wittgenstein and Guy’s Hospital,” Guys Hospital Reports 122, no. 1-2 (1973): 185-93.
28
Kelly Hamilton, “Darstellungen in the Principles of Mechanics and the Tractatus: The
Representation of Objects in Relation in Hertz and Wittgenstein,” Perspectives on Science 10, no. 1 (2002);
“Some Philosophical Consequences of Wittgenstein’s Aeronautical Research,” Perspectives on Science 9, no.
1 (2001); “Wittgenstein and the Mind’s Eye,” in Wittgenstein: Biography and Philosophy, ed. James C. Klagge
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
29
Susan G. Sterrett, Wittgenstein Flies a Kite: A Story of Models of Wings and Models of the World
(New York: Pi Press, 2006); “Pictures of Sounds: Wittgenstein on Gramophone Records and the Logic of
Depiction,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 36, no. 2 (2005): 351-62; “Physical Pictures:
Engineering Models Circa 1914 and in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus,” in History of Philosophy of Science: New
Trends and Perspectives, ed. Michael Heidelberger and Friedrich Stadler (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 2002), 121-35.
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The historical context of Wittgenstein’s turn to philosophy and away from
engineering at the University of Manchester was the successful solution of heavier-thanair flight in 1905 (Europe 1908). It is immaterial to my argument whether or not Sterrett is
correct in her speculation that like many other promising young thinkers, the young
Wittgenstein had enrolled in aeronautical engineering with dreams of building flying
machines and that the burden of Wittgenstein’s genius drove him to seek elsewhere for
an outlet once the Wright Brothers had gotten there first. We do know that in response
to the two enormous technical problems facing turn-of-the-century aeronautics (namely,
building a sufficiently light-weight source of power and steering the contraption despite
aerial instability), Wittgenstein himself contributed to the solution of the first problem by
designing an innovative propeller with jet-propulsion tips.30 The relevant point is that
there is evidence that Wittgenstein mastered crucial engineering concept and continued
to employ them long after he had abandoned aeronautical engineering. The technical
term “method of projection” is particularly germane; for engineers, the projection from
model to world passes through the skills of the model-maker.
The significance of “method of projection” for Wittgenstein is bound up with the
difference between Darstellung and Vorstellung. This difference can be expressed by a
simple historical illustration. At the end of the 19th Century, children in France played
with a toy helicopter designed by Alphonse Pénaud. A similar toy can still be purchased

30

Patent is dated June, 1911. Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius, 34. Fuel was pumped to
a tiny reaction chamber at the tip of each propeller blade. Upon reaction, the jet gas would escape the
chamber tangential to the rotation of the blade, thus spinning the blade faster. The idea was eventually put
into practice—years later by Doblhoff in a WWII helicopter and more recently by Fairey’s Jet Gyrodone.
McGuinness, Wittgenstein: A Life. Young Ludwig 1889-1921 (Volume 1), 68-69.
13

today. The helicopter’s rotors generate enough speed for lift-off because of the ingenious
rack-and-pinion gear arrangement: the child pulls the 18-inch strap (rack gear) quickly,
the rotor turns and lifts the toy, keeping it aloft for flights of 30-40 feet. The toy clearly
proves that heavier-than-air flight was indeed possible. The trick was how to scale up the
toy to a life-sized version.31
Simplistically speaking, the approach of Vorstellung to this problem is to apply a
method of projection that simply multiplies all the dimensions of the toy by a single
scalar. If the sitting space of the toy pilot is four inches, and an adult pilot needs four feet
of cockpit space, a reasonable suggestion is simply to multiply all the dimension by a
factor of 12. For sake of argument, let us set aside technical problems of steering. And let
us suppose there is reliable access to unlimited power to pull the strap. Will the thing fly?
No.
It is worth the trouble to work through the reasons why not, in order to comprehend
the categorical difference between Vorstellung and Darstellung. Perhaps
counterintuitively, flying devices behave differently depending on their size.32
Fundamental to our hypothetical device is the physics of the problem. Because height,
length and breadth have each increased twelve-fold, the weight has increased by a factor
of 123, or 1,728-fold! Since lift is a function of both propeller speed and air density, it is
important to note that the air into which the chopper is to ascend and which must
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Sterrett, Wittgenstein Flies a Kite: A Story of Models of Wings and Models of the World, 1-17.
Although she has undervalued the significance of Darstellungen for Wittgenstein, a concept he
learned from Heinrich Hertz, I’m indebted to Susan Sterrett’s careful discussion of “method of projection.”
See ibid., 155-253.
14
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support the lift of the propellers has not increased density between the toy and the
machine. This means that the copter must increase its own lift by a factor of 1,728,
presumably by increased rotor speed alone. However, here the proposed enlargement
runs up against physical limits of materials. The strength of moving parts—propeller,
shaft, gear strap—is proportional to the cross-sectional area of the part. If length and
breadth have each increased twelve-fold, the strength of the enlarged parts has increased
122 or 144 times, because the cross-sectional area, by definition, can increase in only two
dimensions. Consequently, this is very likely to fail, since the most strength we can build
into the enlarged parts falls short of the additional required lift by a factor of 12!
Instinctively, engineers know that the Vorstellung approach—a modeling-byproportionality—is doomed to fail.33 The only “method of projection” that might possibly
satisfy the design problem is one in which the model is skillfully varied according to
conditions of the problem. This method of projection is a function of human experience,
savvy, and know-how and corresponds to the concept of engineering design or modeling
called Darstellung. In everyday German, one attends the cinema to see a film “presented”
(vorstellen) but attends live theater to see a play “presented” (darstellen). The difference is
clear: a Vorstellung is the same every time regardless of who runs the projector. By
contrast, a Darstellung of a play varies, sometimes wildly, depending upon the actors,
director, and many other features of context.
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Wittgenstein seems to have had something like Hertz’s notion of Darstellung in
mind when in Tractatus 4.0141 he wrote:
There is a general rule by means of which the musician can obtain the
symphony from the score….And that rule is the law of projection which
projects the symphony into the language of musical notation.
We seriously misread this passage if we take the terms “general rule” and “law of
projection” to express the analogy-by-proportion of Vorstellung. That is to say, not just
anyone can listen to a symphony and write out the musical score! However, it may be
possible for very skillful musicians to do so. Yet we must not for a moment pretend that
all there is to musical transcription is working through the one-to-one correspondence
between notes played and the score. After all, there are computer programs that can do
that. By contrast, it also matters crucially to a given performance of a Schumann piece
that the composer wrote the command “Wie aus weiter Ferne” (“Play as if from far away”)
rather than simply “pianissimo” (“Play softly”).34 Of course, I have no idea what the
difference between the two commands is, for I am not a skilled musician. But I’m told by
musicians that “storied” instructions really do matter for performance, and, likewise,
narrative phrases akin to the one used by Schumann, are equally crucial for accurate
transcription of Schumann’s music performed faithfully. In short, the “projection” of the
performance onto a newly transcribed score is internally related to the skill of the
musician who is doing the transcription. Only in this way is the performance “analogous”
to the score. But this is analogy-as-skilled-use and decidedly not analogy-as-proportion.
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How then does Wittgenstein call this projection a “law?” Only in the sense that
musical convention is regularized, for the craft of music is conventional by nature.35 The
projection is not a “law” in the sense that what to do could be specified in advance
(according to the “law”). Rather, skilled musicians are progressively trained—by intensive
participation in the cooperative practice under the watchful eye of a mentor—into a
particular set of conventions surrounding musical notation and performance that can be
discerned in the play of the experts. This training amounts to habituation in both tacit
and verbal know-how.
How then is this a “general rule?” It may be illuminating to read this phrase also as
an expression of the regularized training that musicians receive. The rule in view,
therefore, is not a one-size-fits-all fiat but rather an iterative training regimen, perhaps
akin to “The Rule of St. Benedict.” Thus we might speak of The Rule of Julliard or the Rule
of The London Conservatory of Music.
The Tractarian passage goes on to assert that an orchestra’s performance can also be
“projected” onto a gramophone groove. Like the musical score, the projection onto a
gramophone disc happens by means human know-how, though in this case it is not the
skills of the musician in view, but of the skill of the engineers. This raises an interesting
question. Is the law of projection of symphony onto score the “same” as the law of
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projection of symphony onto gramophone? Here Sterrett claims the German is unclear.36
But on closer consideration the answer seems clear enough: it cannot be the same law of
projection, because the “Rule of Julliard” is not the same as the “Rule of MIT.” These two
disparate training regimens do, however, become coterminous in the case of a Schumann
sonata captured on CD. More importantly, they also become coterminous in the case of
the single individual who learns mastery of both disciplines. The mystery of the unclear
German dissolves in view of the fact that Wittgenstein, being highly trained in both music
and engineering, instinctively assumed that the projections might pass through a single
dually-trained individual, namely L.W. 37
Music never lost its grip on Wittgenstein’s thinking. He wondered if persons
untrained in music could fully grasp his views on language: “It is impossible for me to say
in my book one word about all that music has meant in my life. How then can I hope to
be understood?”38 It is my contention that Wittgenstein never lost his engineer’s eye any
more than he lost his musical ear. Just before writing the Investigations, he composed a
book that, though never published in his lifetime, made it as far as a typed manuscript
known as the Big Typescript. In it he criticized a proposed design for an efficient engine,
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quite possibly suggested to him by his father who hankered after perpetual motion
gismos:

A perpetual motion engine?39

While this device can be debunked by building a prototype, to the one who is trained
according to the “rule of engineering” the device can be simply and instantly seen as rigid.
(That is to say, either the axel joint (A) is rigid and nothing moves or the axel joint is
revolute and everything moves independently of the wheel.40 In either case, the piston
does no work.) Not every layperson can see this, though some can. Yet mechanical
engineers naturally see it, for they are trained to see the world under the aspect of
kinematics. I’ll admit that the concept of “aspect-seeing” supplements and in large
measure replaces some of the engineering motifs in Wittgenstein’s later writings.
However, throughout the corpus Wittgenstein repeatedly drew attention to physical
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“training,” which is so central to crafts such as engineering, music, and philosophy of
language.
Under what circumstances pointing can explain, i.e., convey the use of a word.
Not to a baby. It learns by being drilled.41
I have been trained to react to this sign in a particular way, and now I do so
react….I have further indicated that a person goes by a sign-post in so far as
there is a regular use of sign-posts, a custom.42
By nature and by particular training, a particular education, we are disposed to
give spontaneous expression to wishes in certain circumstances….In this game
the question whether I know what I wish before my wish is fulfilled cannot
arise at all…If I have learned to talk, then I do know.43
That the notion of bodily training persists in Wittgenstein’s thinking makes the following
question worth asking: To what extent was Wittgenstein’s non-contemplative behavior—
from his eating habits to his prayer life—internally related to his philosophical method?
In other words, did Wittgenstein naturally assume that there was a bodily prerequisite for
doing contemplative philosophy well? If so, this fact might make his outlook similar to
medieval monks who practiced rigorous asceticism in order to achieve spiritual insight
and know-how.44
The possibility, however remote, that some of Wittgenstein’s non-contemplative
behavior may be internally related to his method may shed light on what sort of “moral”
requirement might be demanded by contemplative philosophy. On the one hand, the odd
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bits of his biography (giving away his fortune, etc.) may be evidence of nothing more than
the sort of eccentricity that sometimes accompanies genius. If that is the case, we can
conclude nothing about the hypothesized connection between conduct and philosophy.
On the other hand, perhaps Wittgenstein, in strong contrast to modern philosophers, yet
in striking similarity to pre-modern philosophical theologians, felt the importance of
bodily discipline for achieving clarity.45
Raymond Monk reports Wittgenstein underwent something like a religious
conversion while serving the Austrian army on the Russian front. The catalyst for this
experience was his discovery of Tolstoy’s Gospel in Brief, and for a time, Wittgenstein was
referred to as “the man with the Gospels.”46 This period in Wittgenstein’s life can be
characterized in terms of monastic-like vows of poverty, chastity and obedience.
Immediately upon return from the front, Wittgenstein gave away his share of his father’s
vast fortune—Karl Wittgenstein was the Rockefeller of Europe—and for a time lived in as
ascetic conditions as could be imagined, working as a gardener and sleeping in the tool
shed.47 In addition to self-imposed poverty, Wittgenstein’s diaries show that he
considered sexual release to be a detrimental to intellectual rigor. Finally, Wittgenstein
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kept a rigorous diet–Malcolm reports that lunch consisted of a single boiled egg—and a
strict schedule. As Wittgenstein aged he devoted increasing amounts of time to prayer
though, predictably, he thought he prayed badly.48 But he recommended prayer to others
by giving to Drury, Malcolm and others, copies of Dr. Samuel Johnson’s Prayers and
Meditations. Perhaps most surprising of all, he initiated with G.E. Moore a plan to read
together St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans. As Kerr notes, they soon gave it up. But “that
they even tried boggles the mind.”49
Suggestive though theses biographical details may be, my point is not that
Wittgenstein was himself a religious character who thereby falsified a general prohibition
against occupying a theological perspective. My point in rehearsing these biographical
details is only to alert us to the fact that Wittgenstein presumed that what one did with
one’s body is very, very important to one’s work as a philosopher. Particularly germane to
my argument is the fact that, forever in search of illuminating comparisons, Wittgenstein
instinctively gleaned conceptual insight from those disciplines for which fluency cannot
be separated from bodily training.50 Clearly this is the case for music. And it is the case for
engineering. Consequently, it is plausible that there may be other disciplines which
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resemble Wittgensteinian philosophy for the way conceptual fluency and bodily conduct
are tightly paired. Did Phillips see this? It does not appear so. Phillips explicitly states that
the radical pluralism entailed by contemplative philosophy cannot be any ideological
perspective. Yet, pace Phillips, I will next show the way in which a certain sort of
theological craft circumvents his fears.51 But the conditions are twofold. First, a single
practitioner must be fluent in both modes of discourse (i.e., both philosophy and
theology); it is under the skin of the “bilingual” practitioner that the boundary between
contemplative philosophy and theology may be thought to be semi-permeable. Second, as
“theological” doesn’t name a unitary perspective, of the wide variety of modes of
theological discourse, the bilingual practitioner must restrict him or herself to that mode
of theological discourse that comports with the radical pluralism said to be entailed by
the contemplative philosophical outlook.

THE BILINGUAL PRACTITIONER
My intention in the preceding section has been to make plausible the possibility that
contemplative philosophy is a craft practiced by human animals who cannot help but do
so in an embodied manner. Consequently, it is plausible to test contemplative philosophy
against what we know about the bodily nature of other crafts. If Wittgenstein himself
undertook philosophical therapy by means of discourse borrowed from music and
engineering, it is at least logically possibly that contemplative philosophy may, under
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some conditions, finds resonance with discourse borrowed from still other nonphilosophical crafts. If engineering and music are two crafts that resonate with
contemplative philosophy, then it is at least logically possible that theology might be a
third. Of course, it is easy to show that some forms of theological discourse mutually
exclude contemplative philosophy—for example, evidentialist apologetics. On this I fully
agree with Phillips. But if we attend to a broader and longer history of what the craft
called “theology” has amounted to, we will discover that there is a way to see
contemplative philosophy as coming very close to that which some strands of theology
have set as their own task.52 I close this first section by offering two examples of theologyladen discourse that comes near to contemplative philosophy.
In a new book, one incidentally dedicated to the memory of D. Z. Phillips,
Archbishop of Canterbury Rowan Williams writes appreciatively on the thought of
Simone Weil.53 The essay entitled “Simone Weil and the Necessary Non-Existence of God”
deserves far more thoughtful treatment than space here allows. I should not mention the
essay were it not for the striking fact that Williams sees apophatic theology in very strong
resonance with Weil’s view that “God is found only in the experience of divine absence.”54
To the extent that Phillips has himself repeatedly drawn upon Weil’s comprehensive
vision in his own thinking, it is difficult to imagine Phillips denying that similarities exist
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between his and Williams’ conclusions.55 Nor could Phillips have maintained that when
Williams writes on Weil, Williams is doing either contemplative philosophy or doing
theology but not both! Rather, Williams is simultaneously a practitioner of both crafts.56
That much seems obvious.
The tendency to strictly divide disciplines within the humanities is, historically
speaking, a relatively recent phenomenon that has not been entirely beneficial to either
philosophy or theology. The sort of interconnections between disciplines cross-craft
transfer of skills alluded to above has a poignant illustration in the contrast between René
Descartes and Blaise Pascal. Both were expert practitioners of mathematics. For his part,
Descartes was also a philosopher. He invents and posits Cartesian space, a handy
convention that helped to give birth to the notion of “objectivity.” However, some aspects
of his mathematics end up being hobbled by his epistemology: he is unable to solve the
problem of the cycloid (the scalloped loop traced by a point on the edge of a coin as it
rolls across a table; see Fig 1).
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Figure 1 Cycloid path

In Descartes’s mind, in order for a curve to be “properly geometrical,” it must be “that
which can be grasped by the intellect in a single intuition, or by a chain of intuitively
certain consequences.”57 For Descartes, the only curves which passed muster were
arithmetic-algebraic forms, which is to say, curves that were describable by finite
mathematics. Interestingly, Descartes’ considerable mathematical abilities were
hamstrung by a philosophical outlook that bifurcated (a) subjects from objects, (b)
elegant geometry from “brute mechanicals” (such as the cycloid), and (c) the finite from
the infinite. Because he could not conceive the problem, much less solve it algebraically,
Descartes was forced to dismiss the cycloid as “beneath” geometry.58
Pascal, Descartes’ countryman, did not share Descartes’s allergy to “brute
mechanicals.” Granted, Pascal too was a dualist. But unlike Descartes, Pascal did not pit
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the material against the immaterial, nor the finite against the infinite. Rather, the polar
opposite of the infinite was the “nothingness.” The realm of the finite, material and
contingent was suspended in the middle, on the one side borrowing its being from the
infinite and, on the other side, inheriting its imperfections from the nothingness by
participating in both. Historian of science Douglas Jesseph summarized:
The foundation of Pascal’s approach to the cycloid, and indeed to geometry
generally, is therefore the notion that a finite magnitude hangs, as it were,
suspended between nothingness and the infinite, participating in both. As a
result, there is no epistemological barrier to the use of infinitesimal quantities.
These, it seems, are as easily comprehended as any other geometric objects,
and there is no difficulty in assuming that a finite quantity can be divided into
an infinite collection of infinitesimal parts, that these parts can be summed up
in an infinite collection, and yet this collection adds up to a finite magnitude.59
Where did Pascal get this idea? From theology. In his essay on geometry, “De l’Esprit
géométrique,” Pascal paraphrases the Latin text of Wisdom 11:20(21), “But you have
arranged all things by measure and number and weight.”60 This may not sound like much,
but Pascal sees these terms—distance, number and movement (weight), and by means of
them space and time—as grasped by intuition since humans, as created beings, are
naturally endowed with faculties fit for navigating the rest of creation. As a result, Pascal
has no trouble expanding the discipline of mathematics to embrace not only arithmetic
and geometry but also “mechanics.”61 Comprehending mechanicals required
infinitesimals. But Pascal was not as cautious as Descartes. Why was Pascal so daring?
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Pascal was daring because humans and mechanicals together are suspended in the middle
participating in both the nothingness and the infinite.
This is a theological perspective. (It is sometimes called “sacramentalism.”) Pascal
used to place an empty chair to the side of his writing desk in order to remind himself of
his own contingency; at any moment he might fall into nothingness.62 On the other side,
diametrically opposed to the nothingness, his desk opened up to a world shot through
with the perichoretic fecundity of God’s presence from which all things borrow their
existence. This seemingly trivial physical arrangement of his study space was Pascal’s way
of sustaining his bodily habit of seeing the material order (including himself) under the
aspect of sacramentality, which is to say, seeing everything that was created as permeated
by infinitude.
It is anybody’s guess as to why Descartes missed it. My point is that Pascal saw the
world differently than Descartes, because Pascal saw it sacramentally. While Pascal’s
outlook may not be shared by many philosophers of religion today, the practical upshot
was this: Pascal’s invention of a precursor to infinitesimal calculus that applied to
everyday brute mechanicals such as the cycloid was predicated on his ability to “see” the
world under the aspect of sacramentality, which for Pascal meant seeing the simultaneous
double participation of all things in the nothingness and in the infinity of God. I am not
claiming that sacramentality needs to be a metaphysical tenet (though it surely was for
Pascal) in order for it to serve as an aspect under which the problem could be viewed and
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thereby be solved.63 My point is that Pascal’s theology enabled him to see the movement
of a coin under the aspect of sacramentality, to “see” the infinite as permeating all things.
It was this seeing that rewarded Pascal’s eschewal of Cartesian bifurcations and, pace
Descartes, to presume that this brute mechanical world could be described as the real
presence of the infinite in the finite (i.e., by infinitesimal calculus). Ironically, we now
teach infinitesimal calculus inside Cartesian space. And though we, like Pascal, can solve
the problem of the cycloid, we have grown unaware of the religious point of view that
initially made this solution possible.

THE GRAMMAR OF “THEOLOGY”
The preceding section argued the first move of my argument, namely, that
contemplative philosophy is a human craft that, like all crafts, is constituted not by a selfcontained mode of discourse but by overlapping modes of discourse. As a result,
contemplative philosophy must in principle remain open theological modes of discourse
or else it will suffer collapse under its own doctrinaire exclusions. Of course, not every
instance of theological discourse may overlap with contemplative philosophy. So I turn
now to the second move in my argument, namely a description of the kind of theology
that might comport with contemplative philosophy.
In an essay entitled, “Internal Realism,” Finnish systematic theologian Tage Kurtén
tries unsuccessfully to demonstrate conceptual common ground between Phillips and
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existentialist theologian, Paul Tillich.64 Phillips concludes his strong rebuff of Kurtén by
recounting three comforting but faulty pictures that theologians wrongheadedly employ
in hopes of protecting religion from the impending danger entailed by the fact that
certain modes of religious conduct are disappearing (or have already disappeared) from
contemporary Western culture. Religious individualism is the picture that, regardless of
the fate of religion in the external culture, so long as the lone religious believer is rightly
related to his or her personal divine Savior, religious belief is garrisoned ad intra
hominis—on the interior of the person. The second illusory comforting picture is called
religious rationalism. It protects religious belief by asserting, “No matter what cultural
challenges may take place, the validity of religious beliefs is secured by formal arguments
which transcend the relativity of cultural contexts.”65 The third faulty picture, religious
accommodation, describes Christianity as a religion constituted by a never-ending
response to questions posed by surrounding culture and to which religion supposedly has
the answer. “Therefore,” according to this view, “whatever changes in our culture,
however dark it becomes for certain religious traditions, Christianity can always
accommodate the situation by taking on new cultural forms….”66
The ubiquity of these apologetic pictures in contemporary theology is undisputable.
However, these defensive measures do not exhaust the number of possible modes
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theology may take. Nor does theology, in the end, reduce to playing defense. A hint of
what I mean comes from Phillips’s own report of a conversation between Rhees and
Wittgenstein.
I will mention…a remark Wittgenstein made to me after a talk Farrington had
given to our Philosophical Society. Farrington spoke on “Causality in History,”
in which he advanced some version of the Marxian “dialectic,” with the idea
that this shows that in the course of history there is “progress on the whole.” In
the discussion Wittgenstein showed easily enough the incoherence of
Farrington’s discourse. And when he was walking home with me afterwards he
said how he disliked this kind of “optimism” which was supposed to result from
the demonstration (from a theory of history, or of how history must go). “If a
man says ‘Certainly things look bad at the moment; and if you look at past
history, you can find plenty that might lead anyone to be depressed. But in
spite of all that, I am still optimistic.’ — then I can admire this, even if I do not
agree with him. But if his optimism is just the outcome of a scientific proof —
the scientific study of history — then…” That seemed to Wittgenstein a weak
and mealy-mouthed sort of optimism, I think; and one with a sort of smugness
to it. It was not really facing the problem it pretended to face; it was painting it
over.67
While Wittgenstein was describing an imaginary individual in the above example, it is
hard to take seriously Wittgenstein envisioning any lone optimist without also
envisioning him or her as sustained by some particular community or other. I might then
reasonably ask: What might this community look like? And, shifting away from a
scientistic optimist to a religious one, I might also ask: What kind of practices, habits, and
speech sustains a community whose members are marked by religious belief “come what
may?” For that matter, what sort of community of discourse produces martyrs?
Answering these questions is admittedly not a philosophical task. And I will not
undertake answers here, except to note that the three illusory pictures that Phillips
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describes may—although there are no guarantees—may be avoided by the kind of
community that gives priority to first-order religious speech over second-order
theological explanation.68 For example, religious individualism might possibly be avoided
by the community who consistently prays in the first person plural (“Our Father…”)
rather than in the first person singular (“my Father….”). Religious rationalism may be
avoided to the extent that Wittgenstein’s parenthetical phrase, “theology as grammar,”69
is descriptive of the enterprise that shows rather than says what religious belief amounts
to. Conversely, communities whose first-order religious speech and practice is easily
supplanted by explanations constructed in alien vocabulary and grammar is perennially
vulnerable to bewitchment by these pictures.70
Finally, religious accommodation may be avoided by the community capable of
“witness.” Witness is not the same as apologetics. The speech act called apologetics
(apologia) is a relatively infrequent term in the canonical scriptures. It is overshadowed

68

Three paragraphs into his eighteenth lecture, William James describes theological formulations as
“secondary products, like translations of a text into another tongue.” As such, theology and philosophy are
dependent upon primary products of religion, which for James is religious feeling. Although he clearly
admired James, Wittgenstein identified religious practice (including speech) as primary, rather than
religious feelings. William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, The Modern Library (New York:
Random House, 1902), 422. While it is commonplace to think of theology as something that happens later,
after “religion” happens, it is less common to realize that theological speech itself becomes part of what the
community talks about. Consequently, there is no neat dividing line between theological speech and
religious speech as James and others suppose.
69
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 373.
70
Perhaps the following story can shed some light. An agnostic friend of mine, also a former student
of Phillips, once remarked that when I prayed it sounded as though I “believed God to be ontologically real
in the metaphysical sense,” something my friend was eager to fault. My reply frustrated him: “Ontologically
real?” “Metaphysical sense? Why do you think that these terms make my belief clearer than what we
Christians actually say? We say things such as “God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself.” My
refusal to leave the realm of ordinary language had the effect of depriving my friend of the leverage he
thought he had against religious belief. And to that extent I suppose it functioned as a kind of defense. But
in all sincerity I was only trying to remain consistent with the lesson I learned from Phillips, that analysis
must be conducted in the same genre as the sentences under investigation.
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by witness (euangelizō) and preaching (kērygma) by a margin of eight to one. Initially,
apologetics was a speech act reserved for special situations, namely, after one had been
arrested and required to give an account before civil authorities. By “witness” is meant all
acts of communicating the Good News (euangelion) that are isomorphic with the manner
in which Jesus of Nazareth lived and communicated. (Obviously, this is tricky; witness is
a craft in its own right.) But note: religious accommodation is avoided because witness,
unlike apologetics, does not require translation of first-order claims into terms the target
culture already understands. The point of witness is enculturation. By “enculturation” I
mean that a community shows what they are saying by bearing out in deeds isomorphic
with their speech. Witness cannot be accomplished by translation because word-for-word
same saying ignores the behavioral backdrop of our words.71 When my friend John moved
to Ecuador to live among the Quechua, no amount of reading English translations would
do the trick! His first order of business was learning to speak Quechan as they speak it. All
that goes into the manner in which the Quechua speak Quechan constitutes the pattern
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“…a great deal of stage-setting in the language is presupposed if the mere act of naming is to make
sense.” Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §257. A given speech-act has the meaning it does by
word-use-in-context. One can subvert what one intends to say by ill-matched behavior. The two-timing cad
cannot say “I love you” and mean the same as the lifelong, faithfully monogamous partner. So too, the
warrior who cries “Christ alone is the Prince of Peace!” while cleaving the skull of the infidel is our of sync
with the community that takes the title “Prince of Peace” as an appellation of Jesus’ pacifism. On the
relation of pacifism and witness see the culminating Gifford Lecture by Stanley Hauerwas printed as ch. 6 of
Stanley Hauerwas, With the Grain of the Universe: The Church’s Witness and Natural Theology: Being Gifford
Lectures Delivered at the University of St. Andrews in 2001 (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2001).
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John “must” master in order to communicate. And of course that “pattern” necessarily
includes non-verbal patterns of behavior.72 There is a parallel in Wittgenstein:
When I talk about language (words, sentences, etc.) I must speak the language
of the every day. Is this language somehow too coarse and material for what we
want to say? Then how is another to be constructed?—And how strange that
we should be able to do anything with the one we have.73
If theologians are disciplined enough to keep their reflection isomorphic with first-order
religious language (akin to the way Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language is isomorphic
with ordinary language), then such theologians belonging to the “come what may”
community learn a craft that is naturally loathe to transgress the marks of contemplative
philosophy precisely because they are loathe to transgress the boundaries of first-order
speaking. To say the same thing differently, Wittgensteinian theologians maintain that
the way to “go on” begins with the assumption that religion, theology, and philosophy of
religion share a first-order (ordinary) grammar. This is not to deny that each of these
disciplines may have their respective technological terminology. But for Wittgenstein,
importantly, technical terms depend for their very sense upon first-order language. What
is sought by theologians of this stripe, then, is neither explanation nor justification,
neither accommodation nor apologetics, but skilled first-order use. And part of this
skilled-use is knowing when advocacy and explanation come to an end. I turn finally to an
attempt to make clear with a concrete example of theology in action.
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I recognize that I’m writing more about the application of Wittgenstein to hermeneutics that about
Wittgenstein per se. Yet Wittgenstein himself worked hard to do philosophy within first-order speech and
resisted the temptation to invent a philosophical language (as did Tarksi and others).
73
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar, §77. Also §27: “The calculus is as it were autonomous.—
Language must speak for itself.”
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Theology after Wittgenstein
Consider the ordinary, if astonishing, appellation, “Christ is God.” Clear attestations
of Christ’s divinity show up in very early Christian worship. There is no sense pretending
that there is a nifty solution to the seeming contradiction entailed by the claims that “God
is one,” “The Father is not the Son,” and “Christ is God.” Nor is there a point in reducing
the claim “Christ is God” to something as mundane as “Jesus is really swell.” For, were
there an acceptable way to dodge the problem of Christian worship of Christ as God, the
Church could have avoided several tumultuous centuries of excommunicating those
whose proffered explanations were deemed as not going on in the same way, not to
mention avoid three centuries of executions at the hands of those who insisted religious
loyalty to Caesar trumps worship of Jesus the Christ.
One of the earliest written claims is rendered doxologically by St. Paul, “…the one
being Christ according to the flesh who is, above all, God!”74 Contemporary Christians,
who unblinkingly affirm the intelligibility of this sentence, may do so inappropriately or
appropriately, and the difference between them is exactly the difference Wittgenstein
makes for doing theology in a contemplative manner. In the first case are those
theologians (and philosophers of religion) who approach St. Paul’s words under one or
more of the following assumptions: (a) This is surely a “metaphysical” claim; moreover (b)
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The Greek construction is crystal clear: hōn ho Christos to kata sarka, hōn epi pantōn theos (w{n o(

Xristo_j to_ kata_ sa&rka, o( w@n e0pi\ pa&ntwn qeo_j) Romans 9:5. Other clear NT affirmations
are Jn 1;1; 1:18; 20:28; Titus 2:13; 2 Pe. 1:1; 1 Jn 5:20; Heb 1:8-9, Gal 2:20 (variant ms.).
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this is a labeling claim that is either true or false in the label it affixes; and possibly going
further, (c) the veracity of this label must be decided on grounds other than first-order
religious speech (say putative analytical or historical grounds, etc.).
Central to this first group’s strategy is the unwritten and (to them) self-evident
assumption that the copulative “is” expresses identity. “Identity is a precise conception,”
wrote a presumptive Bertrand Russell, “and no word in ordinary speech stands for
anything so precise.”75 When one assumes that the word “is” functions in a perfectly clear
and obvious way, then when one meets puzzles of the form “a is b,” it is easy to conclude
that such puzzles are best solved by defining or explaining the two terms a, b. Garth
Hallett describes how, apart from Wittgenstein’s help, this story has gone:
To the query “How can a possibly be b?” theologians have responded by
carefully defining, distinguishing, and comparing a and b, critics have replied
by applying “Leibniz’s law” (the indiscernibility of identicals) and challenging
the theologians’ solutions, and the faithful have responded by either accepting
the apparent contradiction (such, they may believe, are the requirements of
faith) or losing their faith (such may appear the requirements of reason) or
leaving the whole matter to the experts and simply living with the mystery.76
Well-intentioned as they may be, theologians of the first group by the very shape of their
advocacy, have mucked up the works. But there is another way.
The second alternative follows ordinary language in refusing the univocity of “is.”
The word “is” is a word in ordinary language and whose enormous range of appropriate
use must be learned like that of any other word: by using the word in a wide variety of
ways in a broad range of situations. Either to lump or to restrict this variety begets
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Cited in Hallett, Identity and Mystery in Themes of Christian Faith; Late-Wittgensteinian
Perspectives, 9.
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Ibid.
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confusion. Thus the following sentences, each of which employ “is,” are entirely
befuddling so long as “is” is taken as strict identity.77


The rose is red.



This is my brother (pointing to a picture).



Olivier is Hamlet (in the movie).



The evening star is the morning star.



Ignorance is bliss.



War is war.



Life is a bowl of cherries

As Wittgenstein pointed out, “The words ‘the rose is red’ are meaningless if the word ‘is’
has the meaning ‘is identical with’.”78 Of course the word “is” does not in this case have
the meaning of “is identical with.” But English speakers already know this.
It would take very little thought to extend the above list indefinitely. And in each
case the average person understands; persons of average fluency are capable of adapting
well enough to each new usage of “is” because extending words into new contexts is part
of what Stephen Mulhall (following Cavell) calls the inherent projectability of language.79
Fluent speakers are sometimes successful in extending familiar words into new contexts.
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The illustrations are Hallett’s, although Hallett appears to be saying that “Christ is God” in the
same way that “John the Baptist is Elijah.” In the face of NT affirmations, Hallett’s conclusion is overly
simple. Thanks to Ethan Smith for pointing this out. Ibid., 7.
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Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 175.
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The fourth of Mulhall’s Stanton Lectures at Cambridge (17 Feb 2014, “Analogical Uses and the
Projectiveness of Words: Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language”) is available for download from
http://sms.cam.ac.uk/collection/1637674. The relevant section on projecting a word is from {Cavell, 1999
[1979] #5789@180-190}
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Some attempts may be better or worse than others, and the conversation will flourish or
founder accordingly. But here is the point: Sentences of the form “a is b” are not
understood by means of a strategy that precisely defines a and b, but by reading each
occurrence of “is” extensionally, a reading that is accomplished by means of a method of
projection that passes through the skill (fluency) of the speaker.80 What then of the “is” in
first-order religious utterances such as “God is love” or, our present puzzle, “Christ is
God?” Theologians operating in this second mode, neither define nor explain. Yet that
does not leave them with nothing to do. They seek to read the “is” extensionally. They
articulate where the riddle lies.81 They elucidate patterns in ambiguous data and help
others see under one aspect rather than another. They intervene in wrongheaded or
confused claims en route to showing how the conversation might go on. And they may
creatively project non-metaphorical analogies into new contexts. Such would be the
theological grammarians whose own speaking is itself part of the complicated life lived
together with other believers in the religious community. Simply put, theology after
Wittgenstein amounts to language tutorials, literary criticism, and poetry practice for
those who want to appreciate Christian religion for what it is and intelligibly join in, and
extend, the conversation.

CONCLUSION
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The term “analogical” is too freighted to be useful in many contexts. The problem in the
temptation to reduce “analogical” to mere “proportion.” David Burrell has tried to salvage analogical from
misunderstanding by emphasizing “analogical use.” See Burrell, Analogy and Philosophical Language.
81
Behind Mulhall on riddles lies Cora Diamond and Roger White, “Riddles and Anselm’s Riddle,”
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 51 (1977): 143-86.
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If attunement to contingency—the contingency that is bound up with the sheer
physicality and timefulness of human experience—is at the heart of contemplative
philosophy, then my seemingly innocuous and unobjectionable proposal is that our
physicality and timefulness imply that contemplative philosophy is itself but one of a host
of habit-forming and progressive crafts. Detractors may object that I have painted myself
into a corner. For does not Wittgenstein’s self-descriptive claim (“a philosopher is not a
member of any community of ideas”) naturally become normative for apprentices who
are intent on imitating Wittgenstein? Likewise, has not Phillips, himself a second
generation Wittgensteinian, claimed that contemplative philosophy is part of a radical
pluralism that in the end simply cannot be a theological perspective?
Perhaps surprisingly, I have argued to the contrary that neither Wittgenstein’s
“exile” nor Phillips’s assertion are general prohibitions against theology per se. I concede
that both may function as excellent training heuristics that will enable apprentice
theologians to learn the trade more expertly than if the heuristics are ignored.82 But part
and parcel of mastering a craft is learning to correctly judge when craft-constituting
heuristics are provisional. Piano instructors drill students early on “never, ever cross your
hands when playing piano!” (Student cross hands to cover lack of dexterity of the weak
hands.) Only when pupils have learned this habit thoroughly will they be able, with
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For an outstanding study of the absolute centrality of heuristics, tips and “rules of thumb” for the
learning of one skilled craft, engineering, with sensitivity to Wittgensteinian concerns see Billy Vaughn
Koen, Discussion of the Method; Conducting the Engineer’s Approach to Problem Solving (New York &
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). Koen argues that heuristics are not special cases, but in fact the
heart of practical reasoning. He also shows that, if we stick with Aristotle’s categories for sake of argument,
practical reasoning subsumes theoretical and productive reasoning. In other words, physicians run the most
theoretical aspects of their craft according to skills of practical reasoning. In Koen’s apt phrase, “to be
human is to be an engineer” (58).
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trepidation, to progress to the level of skill that is commensurate with cases where handcrossing is partly constitutive of expertise.
In light of human crafts, then, I’ve argued that there are two conditions under which
a practitioner of contemplative philosophy may possibly find themselves entering
uncharted theological territory. First, it is possible for the boundary between the two
crafts to become semi-permeable when a single person approaches fluency in both crafts,
the craft of contemplative philosophy and the craft of theology. Should cross-discourse
transfer of conceptual skill occur, it need not nullify the particularities of either craft.83
(Thus Rowan Williams and Pascal.) Moreover, I have conceded that there are times when
the prohibition may prove useful for rooting out “uncontemplative” forms of theology
(e.g., apologetics). Yet I maintain that there is a variety of theological discourse that is not
by nature tilted agonistically against Wittgenstein’s method. It is this family of theological
discourse (what Fergus Kerr called “theology after Wittgenstein”) that comports with
contemplative philosophy. The theologian who restricts him- or herself to this mode of
theological discourse, while meeting with silence apologia and explanation exemplifies
the second leg of my argument. I conclude that the budding theologian may become a
contemplative philosopher and as a contemplative philosopher may discover that the
craft of philosophy from time to time involves a certain sort of theological perspective.

Bibliography

83

As Cavell argued, the inherent projectability of language from one discourse to another cannot be
ruled out in advance but is itself part of the contingency of our life with language.
40

Burrell, David. Analogy and Philosophical Language. New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1973.
Desmond, William. Is There a Sabbath for Thought? Between Religion and Philosophy.
Perspectives in Continental Philosophy. Edited by John D. Caputo New York:
Fordham University Press, 2005.
Diamond, Cora, and Roger White. “Riddles and Anselm’s Riddle.” Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 51 (1977): 143-86.
Drury, M. O’C. “Conversations with Wittgenstein.” In Recollections of Wittgenstein,
edited by Rush Rhees, 91-189. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1984.
Ferguson, Eugene S. Engineering and the Mind’s Eye. Cambridge, MA and London, UK:
MIT Press, 1993.
———. “How Engineers Lose Touch.” American Heritage of Invention and Technology
Winter (1993): 16-24.
Hadot, Pierre. Philosophy as a Way of Life. Translated by Michael Chase. Edited by with
an introduction by Arnold I. Davidson Oxford, UK & Cambridge, MA: Blackwell,
1995.
———. “Wittgenstein, Philosophe Du Language (I).” Critique 149 (Oct 1959): 866-81.
———. “Wittgenstein, Philosophe Du Language (Ii).” Critique 150 (Oct 1959): 972-83.
Hallett, Garth L. Identity and Mystery in Themes of Christian Faith; Late-Wittgensteinian
Perspectives. Hampshire, UK & Burlington, VA: Ashgate, 2005.
Hamilton, Kelly. “Darstellungen in the Principles of Mechanics and the Tractatus: The
Representation of Objects in Relation in Hertz and Wittgenstein.” Perspectives on
Science 10, no. 1 (2002): 28-68.
———. “Some Philosophical Consequences of Wittgenstein’s Aeronautical Research.”
Perspectives on Science 9, no. 1 (2001): 1-37.
———. “Wittgenstein and the Mind’s Eye.” In Wittgenstein: Biography and Philosophy,
edited by James C. Klagge, 53-98. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
2001.
Hauerwas, Stanley. With the Grain of the Universe: The Church’s Witness and Natural
Theology: Being Gifford Lectures Delivered at the University of St. Andrews in 2001.
Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2001.
Henderson, J. R. “Ludwig Wittgenstein and Guy’s Hospital.” Guys Hospital Reports 122,
no. 1-2 (1973): 185-93.
Holmer, Paul. The Grammar of Faith. San Francisco, CA: Harper and Row Publishers,
1978.
———. “Wittgenstein and Theology.” In New Essays on Religious Language, edited by
Dallas M. High, 25-35. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1969.
James, William. The Varieties of Religious Experience. The Modern Library. New York:
Random House, 1902.
Janik, Allan, and Stephen Toulmin. Wittgenstein’s Vienna. New York: Simon & Schuster,
1973.
Jesseph, Douglas M. “Descartes, Pascal, and the Epistemology of Mathematics.”
Perspectives on Science 15, no. 4 (2007): 410-33.
41

———. “Descartes, Pascal, and the Epistemology of Mathematics.” Perspectives on Science
(forthcoming).
Johnson, Luke Timothy. Luke. Sacra Pagina. Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1991.
Kallenberg, Brad J. “Cross Domain Transfer and Design.” In By Design: Theology, Ethics
and the Practice of Engineering, 208-47. Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2013.
———. Ethics as Grammar: Changing the Postmodern Subject. Notre Dame, IN:
University of Notre Dame Press, 2001.
———. “Praying for Understanding: Reading Anselm through Wittgenstein.” Modern
Theology 20, no. 4 (Oct 2004): 527-46.
———. “Rethinking Fideism through the Lens of Wittgenstein’s Engineering Outlook.”
International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion 71, no. 1 (2012): 55-73.
Kerr, Fergus. “The Reception of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy by Theologians.” In Religion
and Wittgenstein’s Legacy, edited by D. Z. Phillips and Mario von der Ruhr, 253-72.
Aldershot, UK & Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005.
———. Theology after Wittgenstein. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1986.
———. “Work on Oneself”: Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Psychology. Institute for the
Psychological Sciences Monograph Series. Arlington, VA: Psychological Sciences
Press, 2008.
Klagge, James C. “Wittgenstein in Exile.” In Religion and Wittgenstein’s Legacy, edited by
D.Z. Phillips and Mario von der Ruhr, 311-23. Aldershot, UK & Burlington, VT:
Ashgate, 2005.
———, ed. Wittgenstein: Biography & Philosophy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press, 2001.
Koen, Billy Vaughn. Discussion of the Method; Conducting the Engineer’s Approach to
Problem Solving. New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
Kurtén, Tage. “Internal Realism: A Joint Feature by Dewi Z. Phillips and Paul Tillich?”. In
D.Z. Phillips’ Contemplative Philosophy of Religion, edited by Andy F. Sanders, 95110. Aldershot, UK & Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007.
MacIntyre, Alasdair. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. 2d ed. Notre Dame, IN:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1984.
Mahoney, Michael S. “Infinitesimals and Transcendent Relations: The Mathematics of
Motion in the Late Seventeenth Century.” In Reappraisals of the Scientific
Revolution, edited by David C. Lindberg and Robert S. Westman. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 1990.
McCabe, Herbert. Law, Love and Language. New York: Continuum, 2004.
McClendon, James Wm., Jr. Ethics: Systematic Theology, Volume I. Nashville, TN:
Abingdon Press, 1986.
McClendon, James Wm., Jr. with Brad J. Kallenberg. “Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Christian in
Philosophy.” The Scottish Journal of Theology 51, no. 2 (1998): 131-61.
McGuinness, Brian, ed. Wittgenstein: A Life. Young Ludwig 1889-1921 (Volume 1). Berkeley,
CA: University of California Press, 1988.
Monk, Ray. Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius. New York: Viking Penguin, 1990.
42

Moore, G.E. “Wittgenstein’s Lectures in 1930–33.” In Philosophical Occasions, 1912–1952,
edited by James C. Klagge and Alfred Nordmann, 46-117. Indianapolis &
Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 1993.
Mulhall, Stephen. On Being in the World: Wittgenstein and Heidegger on Seeing Aspects.
London, UK: Routledge, 1990.
———. “Wittgenstein’s Temple: Three Styles of Philosophical Architecture.” In D.Z.
Phillips’ Contemplative Philosophy of Religion, edited by Andy F. Sanders, 13-27.
Aldershot, UK & Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007.
Pascal, Blaise. “De L’esprit Géométrique.” In De L’esprit Géométrique Et L’art De
Persuader, 8-27: Mozambook, 2001.
Phillips, D. Z. Belief, Change and Forms of Life. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press
International, 1986.
———. The Concept of Prayer. London, UK: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965.
———. Interventions in Ethics. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1992.
———. Introducing Philosophy: The Challenge of Scepticism. Oxford, UK & Cambridge,
MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1996.
———. “Locating Philosophy’s Cool Place: A Reply to Stephen Mulhall.” In D.Z. Phillips’
Contemplative Philosophy of Religion, edited by Andy F. Sanders, 29-54. Aldershot,
UK & Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007.
———. “On Wittgenstein.” Philosophical Investigations 24, no. 2 (2001): 147-53.
———. “Philosophy and Theology — Too Close for Comfort. A Reply to Tage Kurtén.” In
D.Z. Phillips’ Contemplative Philosophy of Religion, edited by Andy F. Sanders, 11124. Aldershot, UK & Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007.
———. Philosophy’s Cool Place. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999.
———. “Radical Pluralism.” In Festschrift..... edited by Brian Birch. Tübingen: Mohr
Siebeck, forthcoming.
———. Religion and the Hermeneutics of Contemplation. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 2001.
———. Wittgenstein and Religion. London, UK: St. Martin’s Press, 1993.
Rhees, Rush, ed. Recollections of Wittgenstein. Bristol, UK: Thoemmes Press, 1996.
———. “Wittgenstein’s Builders.” In Discussions of Wittgenstein, 71-84. Bristol, UK:
Thoemmes Press, 1996.
Richardson, John T. E. The Grammar of Justification. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1976.
Ruhr, Mario von der. “Philosophy, Theology and Heresy: D. Z. Phillips and the Grammar
of Religious Belief.” In D.Z. Phillips’ Contemplative Philosophy of Religion, edited by
Andy F. Sanders, 55-74. Aldershot, UK & Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007.
Spengler, Oswald. Der Untergang Des Abendlandes: Umrisse Einer Morphologie Der
Weltgeschichte. Munich: Beck, 1922-23.
Sterrett, Susan G. “Physical Pictures: Engineering Models Circa 1914 and in Wittgenstein’s
Tractatus.” In History of Philosophy of Science: New Trends and Perspectives, edited
by Michael Heidelberger and Friedrich Stadler, 121-35. Dordrecht: Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 2002.
43

———. “Pictures of Sounds: Wittgenstein on Gramophone Records and the Logic of
Depiction.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 36, no. 2 (2005): 351-62.
———. Wittgenstein Flies a Kite: A Story of Models of Wings and Models of the World.
New York: Pi Press, 2006.
Stout, Jeffrey, and Robert MacSwain, eds. Grammar and Grace: Reformulations of Aquinas
and Wittgenstein. London: SCM Press, 2004.
Tilley, Terrence W. The Evils of Theodicy. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press,
1991.
Williams, Rowan. “Simone Weil and the Necessary Non-Existence of God.” In Wrestling
with Angels: Conversations in Modern Theology, edited by Mike Hinton, 203-27.
Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2007.
———. The Wound of Knowledge. 2d revised ed. Boston, MA: Cowley Publications, 1990.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. The Blue & Brown Books. London: Harper Perennial, 1965.
———. Culture and Value. Translated by Peter Winch. Edited by G. H. von Wright and
Heikki Nyman. English translation with the amended 2nd. ed. Oxford, UK: Basil
Blackwell, 1980.
———. “Notes for the Philosophical Lecture.” In Philosophical Occasions, 1912–1952,
edited by James C. Klagge and Alfred Nordmann, 447-58. Indianapolis and
Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 1993.
———. Philosophical Grammar. Translated by Anthony Kenny. Edited by Rush Rhees
Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974.
———. Philosophical Investigations. Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe. Edited by G. E. M.
Anscombe and Rush Rhees New York: Macmillan, 1953.
———. Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe.
Edited by G. H. von Wright, Rush Rhees and G. E. M. Anscombe Cambridge, MA
and London, UK: MIT Press, 1978.
———. Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology. Two Volumes. Translated by C. G
Luckhardt and M. A. E. Aue. Edited by G. H. von Wright and Heikki Nyman
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1980.

44

